The Great Debate: Kavka's Toxin Puzzle

[CakeWalker]

A Billionaire makes a bet with you to drink a non-lethal poison. He will pay you a million dollars Tomorrow Morning as long as you Intend at Midnight Tonight to drink the poison Tomorrow Afternoon. As long as you Intend at midnight to drink the poison, you don't actually have to drink it because you will have the money before you even have to drink it.

1) Draw up a contract that you both sign at midnight - in which you agree that if you are paid $1m dollar in the morning, you will drink the non-lethal poison in the afternoon.

Simple

 

[Alexa]

Isn't this just Schrödinger's Cat?

 

[Bobby Barrows]

A Billionaire makes a bet with you to drink a non-lethal poison. He will pay you a million dollars Tomorrow Morning as long as you Intend at Midnight Tonight to drink the poison Tomorrow Afternoon. As long as you Intend at midnight to drink the poison, you don't actually have to drink it because you will have the money before you even have to drink it.

1) Draw up a contract that you both sign at midnight - in which you agree that if you are paid $1m dollar in the morning, you will drink the non-lethal poison in the afternoon.

Simple

The point isn't whether or not you actually drink the poison. The point is whether or not you actually intend to drink the poison knowing that you will be paid before you even drink it, therefore not actually having to drink the poison. That is what the million dollars are for. Not for drinking the poison, but for intending to.

Your suggestion changes the conditions of the bet. You are paid for actually drinking it, not intending to, which are two entirely separate conditions, as we've discussed at the beginning.

 

[CakeWalker]

The contract is for drinking - but the bet is for intention. The bet is never changed. The contract simply proves intention

 

[Bobby Barrows]

The contract is for drinking - but the bet is for intention. The bet is never changed. The contract simply proves intention

The contract doesn't actually prove it though. You can still renege on the contract, and the contract is likely not allowed in this thought experiment either.

The question brought by the experiment is "How does one measure intent in a scenario where someone knows they can still choose not to do something they Intend after a condition is met."

 

[CakeWalker]

Sounds like the goal posts have moved to me. I am claiming this as a pass.

 

[Bobby Barrows]

Sounds like the goal posts have moved to me. I am claiming this as a pass.

Let me put it this way, if you're negotiating for a contract at midnight, that means the deadline has already passed. Therefore the contract is basically void.

 

[CakeWalker]

No you sign the contract at midnight - signing it on the dot. Means you show intention exactly at midnight.

 

[Bobby Barrows]

No you sign the contract at midnight - signing it on the dot. Means you show intention exactly at midnight.

In doing so, the billionaire still doesn't have to pay you. Action is not the same as intention. If you drink the poison, then you acted on your intentions, but it is no longer intent when you have done something.

 

[CakeWalker]

Going to have to agree to disagree on that point.

 

[Bobby Barrows]

I should also reiterate, the payment is now contingent on you drinking the poison instead of intending to. If you don't drink the poison, you are liable and no longer get paid, even if you were paid beforehand. The contract's conditions are:

You get paid, then you drink the poison.

Which is simply the reverse of

Drink the poison, and then you get paid.

The contract has nothing to do with getting paid for *intending* to drink it, even if the proof of intent is the contract. It is thus that you wouldn't get paid for that reason.

 

[Bobby Barrows]

In layman's terms:

"If you do a thing, I will pay you."

Is not the same as

"I will pay you if you intend to do a thing but you don't have to actually do it."

 

[CakeWalker]

A key part of a contract being valid - is always intention. It one of the main reasons they exist, even as vows for stuff like marriage.

 

[CakeWalker]

In layman's terms:

"If you do a thing, I will pay you."

Is not the same as

"I will pay you if you intend to do a thing but you don't have to actually do it."

The key is - you don't actually have to do it.

But you can do it if you want to.

This problem is based on only needing solve one element of the problem - showing intent.
Looking for a way to not drink it, is actually the trap.

 

[Bobby Barrows]

The key is - you don't actually have to do it.

But you can do it if you want to.

This problem is based on only needing solve one element of the problem - showing intent.
Looking for a way to not drink it, is actually the trap.

Adding a contract only adds to the conditions of the experiment though. Which is why it shows that the billionaire is not beholden to actually pay you because if the contract is the reason for intent, then it is not really intent, it is a legal obligation. Being forced to agree to something via a contract is not the same as intending to do something.

And if you do drink the poison, regardless the conditions, then you no longer, again, intend to do it. Action is the following through of intent, which changes things from intent, an idea one wishes go carry out, to action, the carrying out of intent.

Acting on your intentions means that you no longer intend to do something, it means that you actively did something.

The key to intention is that an attempt via free will is made. A contract forces you to act on something that, even if you signed it, still may not actually intend to do.

The contract solution, while an interesting concept, doesn't work because it still leaves the billionaire in the dark with regards to what you actually intend to do once you have the money, therefore he shouldn't give you the money, because there is no actual proof of intent.